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Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

The diffusion of a new product of uncertain value is analyzed in a duopolistic market in continuous time. The two sides of the market, buyers and sellers, learn the true value of the new product over time as a result of experimentation. Buyers have heterogeneous preferences over the products and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005463873

Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

Rozen, Kareen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979388

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost—the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011265334

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent’s stream of future rents following a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895676

Monopoly Pricing of Experience Goods

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2004

learning and turnover among buyers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004990828

Collaborating

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005000297

Market Experimentation and Pricing

Bergemann, Dirk; Valimaki, Juuso - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 1996

We present a continuous-time model of Bayesian learning in a duopolistic market. Initially the value of one product … externality leads to too much learning. Buyers do not consider the impact of their experimentation on other buyers while the … and allocations in this two-sided learning model. The analysis is presented for a finite number of buyers as well as for a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005093954

The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping

Bergemann, Dirk; Hege, Ulrich - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2001

This paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success gradually diminishes with the arrival of addtional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087360

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005064218

Communication and Learning

Anderlini, Luca; Gerardi, Dino; Lagunoff, Roger - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

makers. We ask whether there exist "full learning'' equilibria -- ones in which the players' posterior beliefs eventually …. Surprisingly, in the latter case full learning may be impossible even in the limit as all players become infinitely patient. We …. In this case full learning equilibria exist. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005593160