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Contracting for innovation under knightian uncertainty

AMARANTE, Massimiliano; GHOSSOUB, Mario; PHELPS, Edmund - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2012

probabilities on the new states. The agents in the economy are classiﬁed with respect to their attitude towards this Ambiguity: the … ﬁnanciers are (locally) Ambiguity-seeking while the consumers are Ambiguity-averse. An entrepreneur and a ﬁnancier come together … contracting problem does not fall within the standard theory due to the presence of Ambiguity (on the ﬁnancier’s side) and to the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933661

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2009

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671578

House Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186232

Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2014

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, school or university admissions etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186242

Strategy-Proofness makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2012

In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933667

Every Choice Function is Backwards-Induction Rationalizable

BOSSERT, Walter; SPRUMONT, Yves - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2013

A choice function is backwards-induction rationalizable if there exists a finite perfect-information extensive-form game such that, for each subset of alternatives, the backwards-induction outcome of the restriction of the game to that subset of alternatives coincides with the choice from that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933670

Top Trading with Fixed Tie-Breaking in Markets with Indivisible Goods

EHLERS, Lars - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2012

We study markets with indivisible goods where monetary compensations are not possible. Each individual is endowed with an object and a preference relation over all objects. When preferences are strict, Gale's top trading cycle algorithm finds the unique core allocation. When preferences are not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010933684

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

EHLERS, Lars; KLAUS, Bettina - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2003

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545738

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

CASTRO, Rui; COEN-PIRANI, Daniele - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 2001

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005545747

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

HOTTE, Louis; WINER, Stanley L. - Département de Sciences Économiques, Université de … - 1998

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005353262