This paper studies the launching of a new fiat currency within a search-theoretic framework. We show that legal tender laws may not be sufficient to guarantee the acceptability of the new currency, and that the withdrawal of a large fraction of the competing currency is essential to avoid the...

This paper synthesizes the shirking and the matching approaches of equilibrium unemployment in order to endogenize the wage formation process as a function of labour market conditions. The steady state equilibrium can take two forms depending on wether the no-shirking condition is binding or...

Why is money divisible? To explore this question we introduce a mismatch problem into search-theoretic models of monetary exchange. We use alternative assumptions about the divisibility of goods and money and the ability of agents to use lotteries on money. Our framework potentially generates...

This paper analyzes the consequences of a working time reduction within a matching model with worker moral hazard. In the "laissez faire", workers and employers bargain over wages and working hours. When the no-shirking condition (NSC) is binding, the number of working hours is lower than the...

This paper studies the role of money in asymmetric double coincidence of real wants environments where in each meeting each agent is a consumer of the other agent's production. Traders who meet at random finance their purchases through current production, sale of divisible money, or both. It is...