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This paper argues that - in contrast to an often expressed view - the formation of larger and more powerful buyers need not reduce welfare by stifling suppliers' incentives. If contracts are determined in bilateral negotiations, the presence of larger buyers may both increase suppliers'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963958
that operate partially on a joint tram network. Merger gains are then decomposed into individual technical efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068886
We challenge the view that the presence of powerful buyers stiffles suppliers' incentives to innovate. Following Katz (1987), we model buyer power as buyers' ability to substitute away from a given supplier and isolate several effects that support the opposite view, namely that the presence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005103179