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The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly
Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2004
We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of .rms and of the insiders. share of total industry gains due to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963874
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Mergers in Imperfectly Segmented Markets
Baake, Pio; Wey, Christian - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2009
arbitrage. Furthermore, a merger can lead to an equilibrium in which only the "high-demand" market is served. This is more … likely (i) the lower consumers' transportation costs and (ii) the higher the concentration of the industry. Therefore, merger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005026827
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Corporate Self-Regulation vs. Ex-Ante Regulation of Network Access: A Model of the German Gas Sector
Meran, Georg; Hirschhausen, Christian von - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2004
This paper compares the outcomes of corporate self-regulation and traditional ex-ante regulation of network access to monopolistic bottlenecks. In the model of self-regulation, the domestic gas supplier and network owner and the monopsonistic gas customer fix quantities and the network access...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005068794
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Does State Antitrust Enforcement Drive Establishment Exit?
Feinberg, Robert M.; Husted, Thomas A.; Szücs, Florian - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2013
Previous work has shown that state-level antitrust enforcement activity may have impacts on entry and relocation behavior by U.S. firms. Significant state-level antitrust activity may be an indicator of a perceived adverse business environment and it is found to deter establishment entry,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011128879
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Bertrand Competition in Markets with Network Effects and Switching Costs
Suleymanova, Irina; Wey, Christian - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2008
We analyze market dynamics under Bertrand duopoly competition in industries with network effects and consumer switching costs. Consumers form installed bases, repeatedly buy the products, and differ with respect to their switching costs. Depending on the ratio of switching costs to network...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963747
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Empiricism Meets Theory: Is the Boone-Indicator Applicable?
Schiersch, Alexander; Schmidt-Ehmcke, Jens - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2010
-ity of the Boone-Indicator using cartel cases. Our analysis reveals that the traditional regres-sion approach of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008568553
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Merger Efficiency and Welfare Implications of Buyer Power
Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Caprice, Stéphane - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2011
different markets. We focus on the interaction between the merger's effects on downstream efficiency and on buyer power in a … size discounts for the merged entity has no impact on consumer prices or on smaller retailers, unless the merger affects … "waterbed effects", that is, each small retailer pays a higher average tariff if a buyer merger improves downstream efficiency …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009216256
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New Networks, Competition and Regulation
Baake, Pio; Kamecke, Ulrich - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2006
We consider a model with two firms operating their individual networks. Each firm can choose its price as well as its investment to build up its network. Assuming a skewed distribution of consumers, our model leads to an asymmetric market structure with one firm choosing higher investments....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004963931
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The Effect of Market Power on Electricity Storage Utilization: The Case of Pumped Hydro Storage in Germany
Schill, Wolf-Peter; Kemfert, Claudia - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2009
In this paper, we develop the game-theoretic electricity market model ElStorM that includes the possibility of strategic electricity storage. We apply the model to the German electricity market and analyze different realistic and counterfactual cases of strategic and non-strategic pumped hydro...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008541303
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Price Guarantees, Consumer Search, and Hassle Costs
Baake, Pio; Schwalbe, Ulrich - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2013
The paper deals with the competitive effects of price guarantees in a spatial duopoly where consumers can search for lower prices but have to incur hassle costs if they want to claim a price guarantee. It is shown that symmetric equilibria with and without price guarantees exist but price...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010896208