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Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Redistribution

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are … endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social … preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540822

Bribes for Faster Delivery

Sanyal, Amal - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services in third world countries. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision, and secondly, by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572156

The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security

Caucutt, Elizabeth M.; Cooley, Thomas F.; Guner, Nezih - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2012

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrializa- tion are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836464

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836472

Interactions Between Product and Labour Market Reforms

Seldeslachts, Jo - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

Labour market reforms face very often opposition from the employed workers, because it normally reduces their wages. Also product market regulations are regularly biased towards too much benefitting the firms. As a result there remain many frictions in both the labour and product markets that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572158

The Social Contract with Endogenous Sentiments

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es …-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572208

"The Key Party in the Catalan Government"

Aragonés, Enriqueta - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

This paper analyzes the different compositions of the catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572211

Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms.

Van Der Stel, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the set of alternatives is represented by the Euclidean plane. The individual utilities for the compromise point are equal to the negatives of the distances of this point to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572221

"Spatial Competition Between Two Candidates of Different Quality: The Effects of Candidate Ideology and Private Information"

Aragones, Enriqueta; Palfrey, Thomas R. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572240

Sincerity in Simple and Complex Voting Mechanisms

Oyarzun, Miguel Ángel Ballester; Biel, Pedro Rey - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

We discuss sincere voting when voters have cardinal preferences over alternatives. We interpret sincerity as opposed to strategic voting, and thus define sincerity as the optimal behavior when conditions to vote strategically diminish. When voting mechanisms allow for only one message type...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572250