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Work Values, Endogenous Sentiments and Redistribution

Cervellati, Matteo; Esteban, Joan; Kranich, Laurence - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

voting over redistribution. Agents have moral "work values". Individuals' self-esteem and social consideration of others are … endogenously determined comparing behaviors to moral standards. Attitudes toward redistribution depend on self-interest and social … preferences. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which sentiments, labor supply and redistribution are determined …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540822

Bribes for Faster Delivery

Sanyal, Amal - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

The paper models the practice of charging bribes for faster delivery of essential services in third world countries. It then examines the possibility of curbing corruption by supervision, and secondly, by introducing competition among delivery agents. It is argued that a supervisory solution...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572156

Stability and Manipulation in Representative Democracies

Bervoets, Sebastian; Merlin, Vincent - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247853

Electoral Competition through Issue Selection

Aragonès, Enriqueta; Castanheira, Micael; Giani, Marco - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2012

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters' true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552339

Smooth multibidding mechanisms

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Quérou, Nicolas - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

We propose a smooth multibidding mechanism for environments where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects (possibly with the help of a social planner). Our proposal is related to the multibidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) but it is "smoother" in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008695000

The Farm, the City, and the Emergence of Social Security

Caucutt, Elizabeth M.; Cooley, Thomas F.; Guner, Nezih - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2012

We study the social, demographic and economic origins of social security. The data for the U.S. and for a cross section of countries suggest that urbanization and industrializa- tion are associated with the rise of social insurance. We describe an OLG model in which demographics, technology, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836464

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2013

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010836472

Coalition Formation in a Contest Game with Three Heterogeneous Players

Vorsatz, Marc - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823881

Rational Sabotage in Cooperative Production with Heterogeneous Agents

Carmen Bevi?; Luis C. Corch?n - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

We present a model of cooperative production in which rational agents might carry out sabotage activities that decrease output. We provide necessary and su cient conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium without sabotage. It is shown that the absence of sabotage in equilibrium depends...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823966

The Informational Value of Incumbency

Carmen Bevi?; Llavador, Humberto - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage with- out recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters informa- ion about governing politicians not available from...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823973