deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be …Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to …

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These … proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the … externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the …

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and … across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within … issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that …

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase …

efficiency remain compatible, as they were under complete information. When incentive constraints are more restrictive, on the …