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Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities. This method is shown to be …Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823913

Efficient Bidding with Externalities

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These … proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the … externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different mechanisms: one for environments with negative externalities and the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823915

Sharing the surplus in games with externalities within and across issues

Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Macho-Stadler, Inés; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2011

We consider environments in which agents can cooperate on multiple issues and externalities are present both within and … across issues. We propose a way to extend (Shapley) values that have been put forward to deal with externalities within … issues to games where there are externalities within and across issues. We characterize our proposal through axioms that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009278197

In whose backyard? A generalized bidding approach

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2000

We analyze situations in which a group of agents (and possibly a designer) have to reach a decision that will affect all the agents. Examples of such scenarios are the location of a nuclear reactor or the siting of a major sport event. To address the problem of reaching a decision, we propose a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572266

Sectoral Spillovers and the Price of Land. A Cost Analysis

Adsera, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1998

If firms and workers are free to move within a country, they will choose to locate in areas where local attributes enhance their productivity. In equilibrium, however, differences in local productivity should be offset by higher local prices. In this paper, I estimates both local sectoral cost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168491

Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

In a market where firms with different characteristics decide upon both the level of emissions and their reports, we study the optimal audit policy for an enforcement agency whose objective is to minimize the level of emissions. We show that it is optimal to devote the resources primarily to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823896

Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance

Macho-Stadler, Inés - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247856

The Making of International Environmental Agreements

Courtois, Pierre; Haeringer, Guillaume - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We examine in this paper the formation and the stability of international environmental agreements when cooperation means to commit to a minimum abatement level. Each country decides whether to ratify the agreement and this latter enters into force only if it is ratified by a number of countries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168446

Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

We analyze a model where firms chose a production technology which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a "clean" technology, and a "dirty" technology. The environmental regulation is based on taxes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168463

Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences

Massó, Jordi; Nicolò, Antonio - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823903