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Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences.

Colom, D.B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on single-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good).

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582664

Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms.

Van Der Stel, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the set of alternatives is represented by the Euclidean plane. The individual utilities for the compromise point are equal to the negatives of the distances of this point to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572221

STRONG EGALITARIAN ALLOCATIONS

DUTTA, B.; RAY, D. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823927

Conditions for any Equilibrium Selection Theory to be Self-Defeating.

Arana, A-Q - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

This study welcomes the assumption that players respect the recommendations made by any given Equilibrium Selction Theory when the game played "suggests" no other alternative and evident way to play.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572225

Sound Belief-Shaping Rules that Make all Equilibria Strategically Unstable.

Arana, A-Q - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A logico-linguistic model is put forward to represent players' knowledge and beliefs.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582659

A Generic Game With no Self-Enforcing Equilibrium.

Arana, A.Q. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

Under not-too-stringent assumptions this study shows that there exists a generic extensive-form game having no "strategically stable" equilibrium. In addition, it is suggested that careless invocation of "common belief assumption" may be a potential source of inconsistent beliefs for players.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572142

Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments

Mutuswami, Suresh; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247858

Three Theorems on Non-Emptiness of Approximate Cores: Part 2. Economies with Clubs

Kovalenkov, A.; Wooders, M.H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

We present a new model of an economy with clubs, where players may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs may engage in a variety of club activities. The activities of each club may be unique to that club and may include provision of private goods, public goods, or simply covariance. Three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572224

Migration and the Evolution of Conventions.

Bhaskar, V; Vega-Redondo, F - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

This paper analyzes an evolutionary model where agents who are locally matched to play a general coordination game can adjust both their strategy and location. These decisions are subject to friction, so that an agent who migrates to a different location may be unable to adjust her strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572234

Three Theorems on Non-Emptiness of Approximate Cores: Part 1. Game Theoretic Results

Kovalenkov, A.; Wooders, M.H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

We introduce the framework of parametrized collections of games and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core … theorems for arbitrary games without (and with) sidepayments. The framework and theorems are sufficiently general to encompass … results in the literature on nonemptiness of approximate cores of games derived from pregames. The theorems are based on a new …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572251