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cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823864
exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727784
In this paper we study a class of cooperative sequencing games that arise from one-machine sequencing situations in which chain precedence relations are imposed on the jobs. It is shown that these sequencing games are convex.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572226
order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582602
We prove the non-emptiness of the core of an NTU game satisfying a condition of payoff-dependent balancedness, based on … transfer rate mappings. We also define a new equilibrium condition on transfer rates and we prove the existence of core payoff … vectors satisfying this condition. The additional requirement of transfer rate equilibrium refines the core concept and allows …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168434
The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823865
Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a general, yet simple, method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823913
We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823915
We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823933
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823948