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On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model

Ruth Mart?ez; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: jordi.masso@uab.es - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of … college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247863

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592869

A Generalized Assignment Game

Ester Cami? - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823865

Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment

Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria; Klijn, Flip; Estela S?chez - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in … matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823950

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823951

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set … matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498408

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498412

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

not carry over. Furthermore we demonstrate that the new algorithm adopted by the National Resident Matching Program to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168440

Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582635