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Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Nakamura, Toshifumi - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2007

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572183

Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572229

Median Stable Matching for College Admission

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572262

The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Dam, Kaniska; Pérez-Castrillo, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal …-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572268

Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain …. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that … yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582635

A Generalized Assignment Game

Ester Cami? - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823865

Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment

Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria; Klijn, Flip; Estela S?chez - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in … matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823950

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823951

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set … matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498408