Showing 1 - 10 of 105
In a procurement setting, this paper examines agreements between a buyer and one of the suppliers which would increase their joint surplus. The provisions of such agreements depend on the buyer's ability to design the rules of the final procurement auction. When the buyer has no such ability,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168473
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In this paper we consider the spatial model by Anderson and Neven (1991) to study the subgame perfect equilibria without restricting the consumers' reservation price. New equilibria emerge where firms locate at disperse points in space. Also, at equilibrium, firms may monopolize some segments of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572186
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We study how the heterogeneity of agents affects the extent to which changes in financial incentives can pull a group out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership. Experimental subjects interact in groups of four in a series of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572147
Under not-too-stringent assumptions this study shows that there exists a generic extensive-form game having no "strategically stable" equilibrium. In addition, it is suggested that careless invocation of "common belief assumption" may be a potential source of inconsistent beliefs for players.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572142
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity as modelled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit such preferences among its employees by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium and thus, they would leave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823939
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the agents generating it. The problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments space. The solution is defined recursively, incorporating notions of consistency and fairness and relying on properties satisfied...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572200
We propose a simple mechanism that implements the Ordinal Shapley Value (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein [2005]) for economies with three or less agents.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582661
In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168439