Showing 1 - 10 of 14
out of a situation of coordination failure. We focus on the connections between cost asymmetries and leadership … with symmetric costs. The overall pattern of coordination improvement is common across treatments. Early coordination … find that initial leadership in overcoming coordination failure is not driven by low-cost subjects but by subjects with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572147
phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically … the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582728
managerial intervention subjects invariably slip into coordination failure. To overcome a history of coordination failure …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168429
either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are … switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168457
The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572157
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572248
As a response to the rapidly growing empirical literature on social capital and the evidence of its correlation with government performance, we build a theoretical framework to study the interactions between social capital and government's action. This paper presents a model of homogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582628
In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes on single-plateaued preferences over a convex and closed subset of the real line (the set of feasible levels of the public good).
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582664
We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823903
We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823937