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Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets

Ehlers, Lars; Massó, Jordi - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498415

Repeated Games Played in a Network

Kinateder, Markus - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247844

NASH EQUILIBRIUM WITH STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES.

VIVES, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823869

Little Perfection and Complexity.

Neme, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823875

Intertemp[oral Transfer Institutions.

Esteban, J.M.; sakovics, J. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823895

Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games.

Masso, J.; Neme, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823897

Compromise VS Capitulation in a Simple Model of Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information.

Obiols, C.P. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1990

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823910

A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition.

Rocher, F.; Vila, X. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1997

The model we discuss in this note is a re-examination of the classical Bertrand model of imperfect competition. the main difference is that consumers are allowed to have some strategic behavior when deciding from which one of the two sellers to buy. We will approach the resolution of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823960

SPACIAL COMPETITION AND THE CORE.

HAMILTON, J.H.; MACLEOD, W.B.; THISSE, J-F. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823968

Tight Cyclic Game Forms.

Gurvich, V.A.; Golberg, A.I. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823972