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Kinateder, Markus - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the … repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of … communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247844

A Generalized Assignment Game

Ester Cami? - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2002

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823865

Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment

Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria; Klijn, Flip; Estela S?chez - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2003

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in … matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823950

Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study

Calsamiglia, Caterina; Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

The literature on school choice assumes that families can submit a preference list over all the schools they want to be assigned to. However, in many real-life instances families are only allowed to submit a list containing a limited number of schools. Subjects' incentives are drastically...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823951

Constrained School Choice

Haeringer, Guillaume; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2006

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston mechanism the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823987

A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem'

Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2011

-to-many matching where agents on both sides of the market have separable and substitutable preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144867

Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests

Ashlagi, Itai; Klijn, Flip - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

We study comparative statics of manipulations by women in the men-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism in the two-sided one-to-one marriage market. We prove that if a group of women employs truncation strategies or weakly successfully manipulates, then all other women weakly benefit and all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574232

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multiunit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008592869

On the Invariance of the Set of Core Matchings with Respect to Preference Profiles

Martínez, Ruth; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

We consider the general many-to-one matching model with ordinal preferences and give a procedure to partition the set … matching mechanisms; moreover, this reduction is maximal. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498408

The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria

Jaume, Daniel; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2009

A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sells and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of (potentially many different) goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008498412