The study of organizational choice is crucial to the understanding of firms' efficiency. We consider this issue applied to contracts on health services. In particular, we analyze the circumstances under which it is better for an insurer to contract with both the hospital and the physician...

We study experimentally how the ability to communicate affects the frequency and effectiveness of flexible and inflexible contracts in a bilateral trade context where sellers can adjust trade quality after observing a post-contractual cost shock and a discretionary buyer transfer. In the absence...

This paper has three objectives: first to analyze the interaction between the basic internal contracts that shape the firm (labour and financial contracts). In particular we show how their temporal dimension are related. The linkage between firm's internal contracts and the project choice...

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

In the standard two-sided matching models, agents on one side of the market (the institutions) can each be matched to a set of agents ( the individuals) on the other side of the market, and the individuals only have preferences defined over institutions ti which they can be matched. We...

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Calculating explicit closed form solutions of Cournot models where firms have private information about their costs is, in general, very cumbersome. Most authors consider therefore linear demands and constant marginal costs. However, within this framework, the nonnegativity constraint on prices...

We characterize the divergence between informational and economic efficiency in a rational expectations competitive market with asymmetric information about the costs of production. We find that prices may contain too much or too little information with respect to incentive efficient allocations...

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental...