This paper analyzes the behavior of the tax revenue to output ratio over the busi- ness cycle. In order to replicate the empirical evidence, we develop a simple model combining the standard Ak growth model with the tax evasion phenomenon. When individuals conceal part of their true income from...

We present a model of tax evasion with a two-period tax liability, in which the administration is unable to commit to any inspection policy. In equilibrium, the probability of an inspection is increasing in the divergence between the present income report and that of last period.

It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that...

We extend the basic tax evasion model to a multi-period economy exhibiting sustained growth. When individuals conceal part of their true income from the tax authority, they face the risk of being audited and hence of paying the corresponding fine. Both taxes and fines determine individual saving...