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Algebraic Properties of Effectivity Functions.

Gurvich, V.A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1991

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005824000

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584607

Strategy-proof social choice

Barberà, Salvador - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2010

This paper surveys the literature on strategy-proofness from a historical perspective. While I discuss the connections with other works on incentives in mechanism design, the main emphasis is on social choice models. This article has been prepared for the Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008584608

Voting Under Constraints.

Barbera, S.; Masso, J.; Neme, A. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350798

STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES

BARBERA, S.; PELEG, B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350804

VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE.

BARBERA, S.; SONNENSCHEIN, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350819

Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees.

Barbera, S.; Gul, F.; Stacchetti, E. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005350833

Voting by Committees under Constraints

Salvador BARBER?; Jordi MassóAuthor-Email: … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572210

Strategy Proofness, Pareto Optimality and Strictly Convex Norms.

Van Der Stel, H. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

A voting scheme assigns to each profile of alternatives chosen by "n" individuals a compromise alternative. Here the … strictly convex norm, common to all agents. A voting scheme is strategy-proof, if voting for one's best point is an optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005572221

Strategy-Proofness and Single-Plateaued Preferences.

Colom, D.B. - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 1996

In the framework of the provision of one pure public good, we characterize the class of strategy-proof voting schemes …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582664