We prove a “General Manipulability Theorem” for general one-to-one two-sided matching markets with money. This theorem implies two folk theorems, the Manipulability Theorem and the General Impossibility Theorem, and provides a sort of converse of the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange,...

Aiming to obtain new characterizations for the concepts of core, cooperative equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, and new correlations among these concepts, we introduce labor time into the assignment game. Two many-to-many matching models are obtained, distinguished by the nature of the...

Rosenthal (1972) points out that the coalitional function form may be insufficient to analyze some strategic interactions of the cooperative normal form. His solution consists in representing games in effectiveness form, which explicitly describes the set of possible outcomes that each coalition...

We consider two two-sided matching markets, where every agent has an amount of units of a divisible good to be distributed among the partnerships he forms and exchanged for money. Both markets have the same sets of feasible allocations but operate under distinct rules. However they are...

In the one-sided Assignment game any two agents can form a partnership. If this is done, the partners undertake some joint activity, which produces a gain that is split between them. We approach this model by focusing on simple outcomes - feasible and individually rational outcomes where only...

Aiming to obtain new characterizations for the concepts of core, cooperative equilibrium and competitive equilibrium, and new correlations among these concepts, we introduce labor time into the assignment game. Two many-to-many matching models are obtained, distinguished by the nature of the...

We prove two Folk Theorems which, together with the Non-Manipulability Theorem (Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983)), have stimulated the development of the theory on incentives for the one-to-one two-sided matching models with money as a continuous variable.

A dynamic game where agents "behave cooperatively" is postulated: At each stage, current nontrading agents can trade and the payoffs from transactions done are maintained in the subsequent stages. The game ends when no interaction is able to benefit the agents involved (case in which a core...