This paper extends the Stahl-Rubinstein model of bilateral bargaining to incorporate many players and multidimensional issue spaces. A central feature of our framework is that in each round of negotiations, a proposer is selected randomly. Our bargaining model consists of a sequence of...

This paper studies the incentives facing Potentially Responsible Parties at a hazardous waste site to promote excessive investigation of the site and thus postpone the beginning of the remediation phase of the cleanup. We model the problem as an incomplete information, simultaneous-move game...

We characterize the open-loop and the Markov perfect Stackelberg equilibria for a differential game in which a cartel and a fringe extract a nonrenewable resource. Both agents have stock dependent costs. The comparison of initial market shares, across different equilibria, depends on which firm...

A linear-quadratic dynamic oligopoly model is developed and applied to the world coffee export market. The model nests various market structures using either open-loop or feedback strategies. The theoretical properties of this model are described. For given observed behavior, the assumption of...

The effect of risk aversion on Nash equilibrium trade restrictions is studied using numerical methods. An increase in a nation's level of risk aversion can lead to either an increase or decrease in its equilibrium restriction and either an increase or decrease in its rival's restriction. The...