The notion of a reservation value is a key feature of most contemporary dynamic and stochastic models of land development. It is clear that the magnitude of the reservation value has a fundamental bearing on the decision to develop or preserve land. This notwithstanding, many papers that analyze...

In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will...

The process of environmental regulation is usually a two-step one. In the first step, a standard for environmental quality is set. Then, in the second step, a regulatory mechanism is put in place to achieve the standard. In this paper I show how renewal theory can be used to set the quality...

I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive...

We comment on four aspects of Albers' [1] model of ecological constraints on tropical forest management. Albers structures her model in a highly asymmetric manner, with strong, uniform biases against development and in favor of preservation. Despite Albers' repeated claims that her model is...

Atemporal and intertemporal use of public lands, the determination of optimal levels of wilderness designation and habitat preservation, and the appropriate regulation of natural resources have all been "hot button" issues in the American West for quite some time now. In this paper, I propose...

In this paper I focus on some important biological aspects of the forest management problem. I model a stochastically developing forest as a multidimensional, continuous-time Markov chain. Next, I pose three questions concerning the long-run characteristics of a stationary forest, the stochastic...

In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the...

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal...

In a two-period model, economists such as K.J. Arrow, A.C. Fisher, and C. Henry, have shown that when development is both indivisible and irreversible, a developer who ignores the possibility of obtaining new information about the outcome of such development will invariably underestimate the...