This paper provides examples of both parametric and non-parametric tests for economies of scale in the control of non-point pollution. Because field-level control costs and control effectiveness are uncertain from the regulator's perspective (due to the existence of asymmetric information), we...

I model the interaction between a regulator and polluting firms as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firms create pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures in a competitive...

Atemporal and intertemporal use of public lands, the determination of optimal levels of wilderness designation and habitat preservation, and the appropriate regulation of natural resources have all been "hot button" issues in the American West for quite some time now. In this paper, I propose...

I analyze the problem faced by an asymmetrically informed supranational governmental authority (SNGA) with limited financial resources who wishes to design an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The SNGA cannot contract directly with polluting firms in the various LDCs, but he must deal...

This paper examines how a regulatory authority might subsidize (i.e., cost share) the partici- pation of associations (or teams) of agents in a surplus-generating economic activity, and how the agents might in turn cooperatively share the surplus. Toward this end, a subgame-perfect equilibrium...

This paper applies two recently developed trading algorithms to a water quality trading (WQT) market located in the Cub River sub-basin of Utah; a market that includes both point and nonpoint sources. The algorithms account for three complications that naturally arise in WQT markets: (1)...

We design an international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions in which autonomous developed and developing regions choose their own carbon dioxide emissions in anticipation of interregional resource transfers to be implemented by an international agency. This agency’s objective...

We compare tradable permit markets and emission taxes as self-enforcing mechanisms to control correlated externality problems. By “correlated” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but which simultaneously cause differentiated regional and global...

In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game will...

We analyze two questions concerning the conservation of biodiversity in a dynamic and stochastic framework. First, given the link between natural habitats and biodiversity, when should a social planner stop the habitat conversion process? Second, what is the nexus between a social planner’s...