Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such ast he Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To capture this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors...

This paper embeds an oligopolistic industry structure in a real options framework in which synergy gains of horizontal mergers a rise endogenouslya nd vary stochastically over time. We find that(i) mergers are more likely in more concentrated industries; (ii) mergers are more likely inindustries...

Entrepreneurs often face undiversi¯able idiosyncratic risks from their business invest- ments. Motivated by this observation, we extend the standard real options approach to investment to an incomplete markets environment and analyze the joint decisions of busi- ness investments,...

This paper studies the interaction between product market competition and takeover activity. We develop a dynamic model in which profit-maximizing production decisions of all firms in an industry as well as the timing and terms of a merger between two firms are jointly determined. We show that...

Many economic decisions can be described as an option exercise or optimal stopping problem under uncertainty. Motivated by experimental evidence such as the Ellsberg Paradox, we follow Knight (1921) and distinguish risk from uncertainty. To afford this distinction, we adopt the multiple-priors...

This paper develops a continuous time real options model to study the interaction between industry structure and takeover activity. In an asymmetric industry equilibrium, firms have an endogenous incentive to merge when restructuring decisions are motivated by operating and strategic benefits....