Fifty years on we examine two key propositions in Neale's (1964) "Peculiar Economics": the need for competitors in sport to have opponents of similar ability in order to earn large revenues and the effect of frequent changes sports leagues' standings on consumer demand. We develop a consumer...

We examine the relationship between college athletic scholarships and adolescent use of performance enhancing drugs. Annually, 4.5 million male high school athletes compete for about 132,000 athletic scholarships o_ered by NCAA Division I and II universities. Estimates from a probit model of...

We develop and empirically test a model of intercollegiate athletic department expenditure decisions. The model extends general dynamic models of nonprice competition and includes the idea that nonprofit athletic departments may simply set expenditure equal to revenues. Own and rival prestige is...

Professional sports teams receive large public subsidies for new facility construction. Empirical research suggests that these subsidies cannot be justified by tangible or intangible economic benefits. We develop a model of bargaining between local governments and teams over subsidies that...

Public subsidization of professional sports facilities has been prevalent for the past 40 years in the United States. These subsidies are allegedly justified by economic benefits owing from sports facilities, including the creation of new jobs, new tax revenues and higher income. Recent research...

Organizing employees into teams increases productivity but also generates incentives to shirk. Recent research suggests that peer enforcement plays an important role in deterring shirking in teams. We analyze 10 years of performance and compensation data for NFL offensive linemen, a high-skill,...