We analyze the impact of electronic money competition on policy outcomes. We consider di®erent assumptions regarding the objectives of the central bank and its ability to commit to future policies. Electronic money competition can discipline a revenue maximizing government and result in lower...

The authors obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization (sup)problems non recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian.

In this paper the authors analyze the interaction of two disciplinary mechanisms: competition and reputation. They first study a dynamic model of monopolistic competition with experiencs goods (i.e., quality is observed after goods are purchased). When market power is high enough, reputation...

The authors study the employment and distributional effects of regulating (reducing) working time in a general equilibrium model with search-matching frictions.

We obtain a recursive formulation for a general class of contracting problems involving incentive constraints. These constraints make the corresponding maximization sup problems non-recursive. Our approach consists of studying a recursive Lagrangian. Under standard general conditions, there is a...

We study the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanims in the private provision of money. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a...

We characterize the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy in economies with either nominal or indexed debt. In a model where nominal debt is the only source of time inconsistency, the Markov-perfect equilibrium policy implies the progressive depletion of the outstanding stock of debt,...

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model with two-sided limited commitment to study how barriers to competition, such as restrictions to business start-up, affect the incentive to accumulate human capital. We show that a lack of contract enforceability amplifies the effect of barriers to...