This paper constructs a simple repeated game model to analyze how industry outcomes alter if a regulated input monopolist is allowed to integrate into the downstream retail market. Integration helps overcome double marginalization-a feature well known in the existing literature. Unlike existing...

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration in a model with oligopolistic firms that exert market power upstream and downstream. In contrast to previous literature, we show that a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency effects...

We use cumulative reaction functions to compare long-run market structures in aggregative oligopoly games. We fi?rst compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games. We show strong neutrality properties across market structures. The aggregator stays the same, despite changes in the number of ?rooms...

This is a preliminary version of a prospective book which springs from concerted effort among several researchers in the fiels of industrial economics. This chapter is devoted to the strategic role of information in oligopoly, and more broadlyn, in monotone games in general.

This paper investigates the endogenous choice between price- and quantity-setting behaviour in a duopoly game where firms invest in product development first, and then play a marketing game later. Only in the initial R&D stage, the two firms set up a joint venture in order to share the costs of...

A supergame between public and private firms in an oligopolist industry is studied in this paper. We discover that there is a repeated-game equilibrium where the public firm produces less than its one-shot Nash equilibrium quantity, nevertheless the total supply and hence the social welfare are...

We study a location game where consumers are distributed according to some density f and where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially. This permits an endogenous determination of the number of active ¯rms, their locations and the sequence in which these locations are occupied. While in...

The effect of merger between competing firms in the same industry is twofold. It increases concentration, which has a negative effect on welfare unless the merger substantially lowers production costs. If products are differentiated, however, there is another effect: before the product is...

This paper presents substantial new evidence on the competitive process that links together industrial economics and international economics. Our time-series data base concerns manufactured product prices and their domestic and international determinants. We identify cointegrating relationships,...

We derive a measure of firm speed of price adjustment that is directly inversely related to market power and compare this to the measure derived by Martin (1993). However, both measures are incorrect when firms have non-zero price conjectural variations and treat competing price levels as...