When goods are sold through competing auctions, what e¤ect does monetary policy have on the equilibrium allocation? To answer, we extend the competing auctions framework in several ways: buyers choose how much money they bring to an auction, the quantities traded at the auctions are endogenous,...

This paper juxtaposes the policy trend towards price stability with the theoretical optimal quantity of money. After reviewing alternatives to the Friedman (1969) optimum, it focuses on the effect of costly nominal adjustment as a result of inflation.

The paper functionally describes the income velocity of money by including the cost of a key substitute to money: exchange credit. Financial innovation causes the cost of credit to fall, the quantity of money demanded to fall, and the velocity to rise, all without shifting the money demand function.

The Fisher equation predicts that nominal interest rates and inflation should move together one-for-one. Recently published work argues that both nominal interest rates and inflation are non-linear. The evidence in this paper suggests that nominal interest rates are well described as two-regime...

The Fisher hypothesis has been a much debated topic. Over the years the hypothesis debated and the techniques used have changed. While the majority of early studies on the Fisher effect concentrated primarily on confirming the long and distributed lag in expectations formation, subsequent work...

Mechanisms according to which private intermediaries or governments charge transaction fees or indirect taxes are prevalent in practice. We consider a setup with multiple buyers and sellers and two-sided independent private information about valuations. We show that any weighted average of...

This paper studies a complete-information bargaining game with one buyer and multiple sellers of di¤erent ?sizes? or bargaining strengths. The bargaining order is determined by the buyer. If the buyer can commit to a bargaining order, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome where...

This paper estimates the cost of using simple percentage fees rather than the broker optimal Bayesian mechanism, using data for real estate transactions in Boston in the mid-1990s. This counterfactual analysis shows that interme-diaries using the best percentage fee mechanisms with fees ranging...

We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projets, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium...

Existing theories typically focus on asymmetric information to explain delays in bargaining. This is not always appropriate, particularly when the parties are in a long-term relationship. This paper examines the incentive to delay agreement (or innovation) when: there are multiple bargaining...