Unexpected variation in emissions can have a substantial impact on the prices and efficiency of tradable emission permit markets. In this paper we report results from a laboratory experiment in which subjects participate in an emissions trading market in the presence of emissions uncertainty....

The herding of expert opinions is often rationalized as the outcome of social learning. However, experts are typically individuals with career concerns. As a result,herding can also arise from the fear of opposing consensus opinion and the potential career consequences of being wrong. We...

This paper presents a model and an experiment, both suggesting that wishful thinking is a pervasive phenomenon that aect decisions large and small. Agents in the model start out with state-dependent payos, and behave as if high-payo states are more likely. Subsequent choices maximize...

This paper considers the question whether it is possible, using information about only the distribution of earnings, to identify some of the labour supply incentive effects of a tax and transfer system.

A number of studies have shown that peer punishment can sustain cooperation in public good games. This paper shows that the format used to give subjects feedback is critical for the e¢ cacy of punishment. Providing subjects with infor- mation about the earnings of their peers leads to lower...

We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each others' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in...

Punishing free riders might promote cooperation, but it can also lead to feuds. We use a public good game with punishment opportunities to investigate whether the threat of feuds is e¢ ciency enhancing. Treatments di¤er with respect to whether a punish- ment can trigger a feud. In the main...

We study the relationship between group size and the extent of risk sharing in an insurance game played over a number of periods with random idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to income in each period. Risk sharing is attained via agents that receive a high endowment in one period making...

We study the relationship between group size and the extent of risk sharing in an insurance game played over a number of periods with random idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks to income in each period. Risk sharing is attained via agents that receive a high endowment in one period making...

The imposition of sanctions is one of the most common means of enforcing cooperation in decentralized interactions. Typically, agents are asymmetric in the sense that each has a different sanctioning power. Using a public-good experiment we analyze such a decentralized punishment institution in...