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The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan

Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 2009

Applying auction theory to the toxic-asset rescue plan currently released by the United States Treasury Department …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004965234

Debt- Versus Equity-Financing in Auction Designs

Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 2010

A social planner wishes to launch a project but the contenders capable of running the project are cash-constrained and may default. To signal their capabilities, the contenders may finance their bids through debt or equity, depending on the mechanism chosen by the social planner. When...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008485544

Jump Bidding and Overconcentration in Decentralized Simultaneous Ascending Auctions

Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 2006

A model of English auction that allows jump bidding is proposed. When two objects are sold separately via such English … function is superadditive. Consequently, the auction game overly concentrates the goods to a multi-item bidder and never overly …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005437347

RESERVATION PRICE ANNOUNCEMENT IN SEALED BID AUCTIONS: COMMENT

SCHROETER, John R. - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 1996

This comment corrects some errors of analysis contained in a 1993 paper by Carey in the Journal of Industrial Economics.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005154639

Collusion Via Resale

Garratt, Rod; Troger, Thomas; Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng - Department of Economics, Iowa State University - 2007

The English auction is susceptible to tacit collusion when post-auction inter-bidder resale is allowed. We show this by … constructing equilibria where, with positive probability, one bidder wins the auction without any competition and divides the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005023642