time effects. All countries display a massive reallocation of resources, with the entry and exit of many firms in all … market contestability. There are also large differences across groups of countries. While entry and exit rates are fairly … similar across industrial countries, post entry performance differs markedly between Europe and the U.S., a potential …

time effects. All countries display a massive reallocation of resources, with the entry and exit of many firms in all … market contestability. There are also large differences across groups of countries. While entry and exit rates are fairly … similar across industrial countries, post entry performance differs markedly between Europe and the U.S., a potential …

. Another important determining factor is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index at the moment of entry: it is significantly easier to …

market decisions in the face of the threat of entry, in a dynamic model.The main results of the paper are: there exists a … threat of entry; andthere are parameter values for which the bank makes more profits with the threat of entry thanwithout. …

We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new …

We develop a model of endogenous lobby formation in which wealth inequalityand political accountability undermine entry … earned withless competition. Entry and investor protection improve when wealth distribu-tion becomes less unequal, and the … greater accountability is associated with higher entry in sectors that are more dependent on external capital and have greater …

Entry requires external finance, especially for less wealthy entrepreneurs, so poor investor protection limits … voters. In a broad cross-section of countries and industries, we find that (i) entry rates and the total number of producers … accountable political institutions have better investor protection and lower entry costs. We also find that investor protection is …