The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games offers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is...

This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m x m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in...

This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched to play a symmetric 2 x 2 game in biological fitnesses. Each agent is biased in favor of one of the strategies, and receives a noisy signal of his and his opponent`s bias. With...

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze (Monatshefte fur Mathematik 110, 1990, 189-206) and Oechssler and Riedel (Economic Theory 17, 2001, 141-162) provide conditions for the stability of rest points...

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of how asymmetric information impacts on adverse selection and market efficiency.  We adopt Akerlof's (1970) unit-demand model extended to a setting with multidimensional public and private information.  Adverse selection and efficiency are...

An increasingly important organisational design problem for many firms is to recoup general human capital rents while maintaining attractive career prospects for workers. We explore the role of information management in this context. In our model, an information management policy determines the...