This paper is empirical study, using new experimental data, of repeated game strategies in trust games; its goal is to identify strategies that people use in repeated games. We develop a strategy inference method that maps observed actions to a set of best fitting unobserved repeated game...

Measures of central banks` independence and central banks` accountability which are based on an interpretation of their statutes provide, in themselves, no guidance for the assessment of legislative proposals. In the effectiveness of monetary policy, the crucial considerations relate to how...

For financial assets whose best quotes almost always change by jumping by the market`s price tick size (one cent, five cents, etc.), this paper proposes an estimator of Quadratic Variation which controls for microstructure effects. It measures the prevalence of alternations, where quotes jump...

Measures of central banks' independence and central banks' accountability which are based on an interpretation of their statutes provide, in themselves, no guidance for the assessment of legislative proposals. In the effectiveness of monetary policy, the crucial considerations relate to how...

Financial assets` quoted prices normally change through frequent revisions, or jumps. For markets where quotes are almost always revised by the minimum price tick, this paper proposes a new estimator of Quadratic Variation which is robust to microstructure effects. It compares the number of...

We identify necessary and sufficient conditions under which a finite data set of price vectors and consumption bundles can be rationalized by a weakly separable utility function.  Our result could be understood as a generalization of Afriat's Theorem.

Consider a finite data set of price vectors and consumption bundles; under what conditions will there be a weakly separable utlity function that rationalizes the data?  This paper shows that rationalization in this sense is possible if and only if there exists a preference order on some finite...

A generalized version of the capital management problem posed in a classic paper by R.H. Strotz is analyzed for the case of the naive planner who fails to anticipate any impending change in his own preferences. By imposing progressively stronger restrictions on the primitive of the problem -...

Saddlepath learning occurs when agents learn adaptively using a perceived law of motion that has the same form as the saddlepath relationship in rational expectations equilibrium.  Under saddlepath learning, we obtain a completely general relationship between determinacy and e-stability, and...

Consider a finite data set where each observation consists of a bunde of contingent consumption chosen by an agent from a constraint set of such bundles.  We develop a general procedure for testing the consistency of this data set with a broad class of models of choice under risk and under...