Showing 1 - 10 of 102
Allocations familiales et autres transferts cibles sont generalement verses aux meres, sur la base de l`observation qu`augmenter la part des ressources controlees par les meres conduit a ameliorer le bien-etre des enfants. Nous recensons un ensemble de resultats empiriques qui etablisent le...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090623
We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to different public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090649
We propose a new, easy-to-implement, class of payment rules, "Reference Rules", to make core-selecting package auctions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004137
.  We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a subset of the core of the game with a natural equity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004342
of games generalises games in characteristic and partition function form.  definitions of the core for this class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047701
learning process converges in polynomial time to the core.  While convergence to the core is known for some types of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071726
of firm-level heterogeneity in technical and allocative efficiency levels. FDM is implemented on a G-5 banking dataset …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047831
in an attempt to save on informational rents and improve productive efficiency. We show that, if the contractor is free …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090666
In this paper we analyze a simple two-sided adverse selection model with one principal and one agent. They are both risk neutral and have private information about their type. We also assume that the private information of the principal is correlated with the one of the agent. The main result of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047891
Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister`s exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047938