Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and complex that individual players are in the dark about others' actions and the payoff structure.  This paper analyzes learning behavior in such 'black box' environments, where players' only source of information...

We present experimental evidence which sheds new light on why women may be less competitive than men.  Specifically, we observe striking differences in how men and women respond to good and bad luck in a competitive environment.  Following a loss, women tend to reduce effort, and the effect is...

Although it is well known that trust is an important component of the fulfilment of incomplete contracts, less is known regarding how robust it is to past experiences.

Working with a sample of individuals from 43 countries, including some of the most and least corrupt in the world, we run an experiment in which: `private citizens` have to decide whether and how much to offer `public servants` in exchange for corrupt services; `public servants` have to decide...

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.  When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms...

Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external controls and the severity of punishment.  An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for reform.  Recent studies have shown that both top-down...

This paper tests the external validity of a simple Dictator Game as a laboratory analogue for a naturally occurring policy-relevant decision-making context.  In Uganda, where teacher absenteeism is a problem, primary school teachers' allocations to parents in a Dictator Game are positively but...

Using a specially designed lab-type experiment conducted in the field, we compare the willingness of head teachers, centrally appointed public servants, and community representatives to hold Ugandan primary school teachers to account.  We find no difference in the willingness of centrally...

We show that introducing an external capital market with information asymmetry into a product market model reduces opportunistic substitution of sub-standard goods and encourages producers to concentrate on long-run reputation building.  We test this result with a laboratory experiment.  We...

We use an online real-effort experiment to investigate how bonus-based pay and worker productivity interact with workplace cheating.  Firms often use bonus-based compensation plans, such as group bonuses and firm-wide profit sharing, that induce considerable uncertainty in how much workers are...