threshold is reached, potentially generating an equilibrium-selection problem. When the evolution of play approximates a best …

evolution of collective action: as part of a strategy-revision process, updating players choose quantal responses to existing …

This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that … inertia states that allow Ellison`s (Review of Economic Studies 67, 2000, 17-45) step-by-step evolution to occur. …

This paper models the indirect evolution of the preferences of a population of fully rational agents repeatedly matched … requires the extension of recent techniques for evolution on infinite strategy spaces, introducing new setwise stability …

Models of macroeconomic learning are populated by agents who possess a great deal of knowledge of the "true" structure … of the economy, and yet ignore the impact of their own learning on that structure; they may learn about an equilibrium …, but they do not learn within it.  An alternative learning model is presented where agents' decisions are informed by …

are in the dark about others' actions and the payoff structure.  This paper analyzes learning behavior in such 'black box … we study voluntary contributions games.  We identify two robust features of the players' learning dynamics: search …