This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets onbank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks' riskand raise banks' values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market.The risk reduction is achieved...

Banks create excessive systemic risk through leverage and maturity mismatch, as financial constraints introduce welfare-reducing pecuniary externalities.  Macroprudential regulators can achieve efficiency with simple linear constraints on banks' balance sheets, which require less information...

We present a model for Financial fragility in which banks are risk-averse portfolio managers and there is uncertainty over risk management parameters. There is a danger of heightened risk aversion and projects in small economies are assumed to be riskier than those in large economies. In this...

This paper proposes that all new euro area sovereign borrowing be in the form of jointly guaranteed Eurobonds.  To avoid classic moral hazard problems and to insure the guarantors against default, each country would pay a risk premium conditional on economic fundamentals to a joint debt...

In this paper we analyse market co-movements during the global financial crisis.  Using high frequency data and accounting for market microstructure noise and non-synchronous trading, interdependencies between differing asset classes such as equity, FX, fixed income, commodity and energy...

This paper presents a simple model of risk-averse banks that face uncertainty over funding conditions in the money market.  It shows when increased funding uncertainty causes interest rates on loans and deposits to rise, while bank lending and bank profitability fall.  It also finds that...

Interconnections among financial institutions create potential channels for contagion and amplification of shocks to the financial system.  We propose precise definitions of these concepts and analyze their magnitude.  Contagion occurs when a shock to the assets of a single firm causes other...

This paper extends the model proposed by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2003, 2004a,b) to an infinite horizon setting. Thus, we are able to assess how the model conforms with the time series data of the U.K. banking system. We conclude that, since the model performs satisfactorily, it can be...

The objective of this paper is to propose a model to assess risk for banks. Its main innovation is to incorporate endogenous interaction between banks, recognising that the actual risk to which an individual bank is exposed also depends on its interaction with other banks and other private...

In this paper, we analyse a novel panel data set to compare the relevance of alternative measures of capitalisation for bank failure during the 2007-10 crisis, and to search for evidence of manipulated Basel risk-weights.  Compared with the unweighted leverage ratio, we find the risk-weighted...