In an asymmetric war of attrition the players` prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A stochastic strength ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be strong ex ante, even though her...

Ghanaian manufacturing firms face a highly risky environment. Firms may attempt to manage these risks by undertaking production, input, and investment strategies designed to lower profit variability. Mean-variance analysis implies, however, that these strategies involve a trade-off with lower...

This note proposes a necessary and sufficient condition on a preference to guarantee that the demand function it generates satisfies the law of demand. It shows that the law of demand may be succinctly characterized by differences in an agents level of risk aversion when she is confronted with...

Using survey data and a field experiment to measure agents` risk and time preferences, we identify the agent-type that is free to reveal its preferences through decisions about pension system participation. Thus, we show that in Chile the appropriate focus for policy makers interested in the...

This note determines the precise connection between an agent`s attitude towards income risks and his attitude over risks in the underlying consumption space. Our results follow a general mathematical theory connecting the curvature properties of an objective function with the ray-curvature...

This paper examines conditions which guarantee that the excess demand function of an exchange economy will satisfy the weak axiom in an open neighborhood of a given equilibrium price. This property ensures that the equilibrium is locally stable with respect to Walras tatonnement. A related issue...

This paper analyses principal-agent contracts when the agent`s action generates information not directly verifiable but used by the agent to make a risky decision. It considers a more general formulation than those studied previously, focusing on the impact on the decision made and the contract...

In the workhorse  model of welfare economics, the elasticity of marginal utility, often denoted as η, serves simultaneously to represent aversion to risk, aversion to spatial inequality, and preferences for intertemporal substitution.  While Kreps-Porteus-Selden and Epstein-Zin preferences...

We study a model of informed principal with private values where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. We show that the principal, regardless of her type, gains by not revealing her type to the agent through the contract offer. The equilibrium allocation transfers some...