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Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining

Tyson, Christopher - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004

A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form … details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that … bargaining problems of the sort that have historically been deemed indeterminate, thereby ensuring that the dynamic problems …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604968

Bribing Voters

Bo, Ernesto Dal - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

We show how an outside party offering incentives to voters can manipulate at no cost collective decisions made through voting. Under influence, these decisions can become inefficient. Therefore, the market for policies may be more likely to fail than the markets for goods, because (democratic)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604871

A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have The Same Evidence

List, Christian; Dietrich, Franz - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

In the classical Condorcet jury model, different jurors votes are independent random variables, where each juror has the same probability p1/2 of voting for the correct alternative. The probability that the correct alternative will win under majority voting converges to 1 as the number of jurors...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604991

A Possibility Theorem on Aggregation Over Multiple Interconnected Propositions

List, Christian - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

Drawing on the so-called `doctrinal paradox`, List and Pettit (2002a) have shown that, given an unrestricted domain condition, there exists no procedure for aggregating individual sets of judgments over multiple interconnected propositions into corresponding collective ones, where the procedure...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047837

Bribing Voters.

Dal Bo, E. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051078

Supermajority Voting Rules: Balancing Commitment and Flexibility

Bo, Ernesto Dal - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

When optimal policymaking is subject to dynamic inconsistencies (Kydland and Prescott, 1977), but shocks hit the economy after private agents form expectations, there is a trade off between the need to commit to a policy, and the need to retain discretion so as to respond to shocks. Rogoff...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051097

Competition in Posted Prices With Stochastic Discounts

Gill, David; Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers (termed 'bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly; of markets in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004203

Host Country-Foreign Investor Bargaining Power and Investment Incentive Provisions in Multilateral Investment Agreements

Mash, Richard - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

a third benefit from commitment which arises from low host country bargaining power when negotiating incentive levels … with foreign investors. If bargaining power is low, incentives agreed under bargaining will be generous to the investor and … host country welfare will be lower than otherwise. It is shown that this consequence of low bargaining power may be avoided …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604853

Modelling Transactions with Ultimatum Games: An Experiment on Certification

Guerra, Gerardo A. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2002

Ultimatum games have been extensively used in experimental studies. By studying the consequences that restrictions shared by ultimatum games have in subject`s behaviour, this paper argues that some results are falsified by design constraints. This paper also presets a taxonomy of certification,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604902

The Optimal Marketing Mix of Posted Prices, Discounts and Bargaining

Thanassoulis, John; Gill, David - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2010

pricing and bargaining when price takers buy at posted prices but bargainers attempt to negotiate discounts. The optimal … bargaining strategy involves the firms offering bargainers randomly-sized discounts. Competing firms keep posted prices high to …' strategic decision about how much bargaining discretion sales staff should be allowed. Both firms allowing full bargaining …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008469784