Showing 1 - 10 of 11
Jewish emancipation in nineteenth century Europe produced drastically different responses.  In Germany, a liberal variant known as Reform developed, while ultra-Orthodox Judaism emerged in eastern Europe.  We develop a model of religious organization which explains this polarization.  In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009191087
Party activists wish to (i) advocate the best policy and yet (ii) unify behind a common party line. An activist`s understanding of his environment is based on the speeches of party leaders. A leader`s influence, measured by the weight placed on her speech, increases with her judgement on policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047752
We construct an equilibrium random matching model of the labour market, with endogenous market participation and a general matching technology that allows for market size effects: the job-finding rate for workers and the incentives for participation change with the level of unemployment. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047853
In the context of macroeconomic coordination, studies of the social value of information distinguish sharply between …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047915
This paper studies the optimal allocation of coordination responsibilities in organizations where duplication of effort …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047951
Party activists face a coordination problem: a critical mass (a barrier to coordination) must advocate a single policy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051090
This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977898
The volunteer`s dilemma is an asymmetric n-player binary-action game in which a public good is provided if and only if at least one player volunteers, and consequently bears some private cost. So long as the value generated for every player exceeds this private cost there are n pure-strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047810
In a collective-action game a player`s payoff is the sum of (i) a private component that depends only on that player`s action, and (ii) a public component, common to all players and dependent upon all actions. A classic application is the private provision of a public good. Play evolves:...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090646
The purpose of this paper is to reflect, from an economist`s point of view, on the methodological issues raised by the study of social capital. This term has been used in many different ways to cover a broad range of phenomena (Durlauf & Fafchamps 2002). Perhaps it is best seen as a way of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051085