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Instant Exit from the Asymmetric War of Attrition
Myatt, David P. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005
In an asymmetric war of attrition the players` prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A stochastic strength ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be strong ex ante, even though her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047908
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Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009
auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue.  We … also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004186
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When are Auctions Best?
Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007
buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding earlier entrants can make … conducive to entry in several ways it usually generates higher expected revenue. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604887
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Entry and Exit in Grocery Retailing: Local Pre-Emption and Social Efficiency
Smith, Howard - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000
used to examine the strategic local entry and exit behaviour of the firms and the social efficiency of stores numbers and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605032