Showing 1 - 10 of 41
This paper investigates the interaction between corruption and infrastructure policy reforms.  I construct a simple model to illustrate how both an incerase in regulatory autonomy and privatisation may influence the effect of corruption.  This interaction is then analysed empirically using a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318140
of 2007 and the US linkLine case of 2009.  The analysis focuses on whether competition law and regulation are complements …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991312
on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047917
We experimentally investigate the extent to which social obervability of one's actions and the possibility of social non-monetary judgment affect the decision to engage in rule breaking behavior.  We consider three rule bfeaking scenarios - theft, bribery and embezzlement - in the absence of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004296
This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Bureaucrats are supposed to grant licences to firms that satisfy certain requirements. Firms have to invest into satisfying these requirements. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they give the licence to any...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047806
profits.  Two forms of open access regulation can mitigate these problems: (i) direct price regulation of the form whereby a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004390
The regulator of a natural monopoly that sets a two-part tariff and whose marginal cost is stochastic will generally want the price to vary less than marginal cost when the lump-sum charge in the tariff is fixed. A trade-off exists between efficient pricing and an optimal allocation of risk....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977861
Working with a sample of individuals from 43 countries, including some of the most and least corrupt in the world, we run an experiment in which: `private citizens` have to decide whether and how much to offer `public servants` in exchange for corrupt services; `public servants` have to decide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010820336
Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect.  When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004152
This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour.  Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004177