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Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.  In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date.  Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world.  We build a model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291911
monitoring is employed by VCs to reduce entrepreneurial moral hazard. When monitoring reveals poor performance, VCs want to … helps reduce this problem. As potential equity holders, VCs are willing to absorb the costs of monitoring because this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661352
entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which can be partially overcome through monitoring only by informed investors. However …, monitoring is only effective if investors can commit ex ante to liquidate the project after observing a poor signal. We show that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661398
The credit derivatives market provides a liquid but opaque forum for secondary market trading of banking assets. I show that when entrepreneurs rely upon the certification value of bank debts to obtain cheap bond market insurance, the existance of a credit derivatives market may cause them to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661416
Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external … accountable.  This paper investigates the effectiveness of an accountability system that combines bottom-up monitoring and top … bribes under: 1) no monitoring; 2) conventional top-down auditing, and 3) an accountability system which gives citizens the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004232
which will then be the object of the monitoring. The monitoring is therefore much less effective then when the principal can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090666