Monetary policy can play an important role in managing oil discoveries. Ideally governments will use fiscal policy to smooth consumption of oil income. In practice this often does not happen, as governments delay spending until oil revenues are received. This induces changes in the economy, both...

Demand for oil is very price inelastic.  Facing such demand, an extractive cartell induces the highest price that does not destroy its demand, unlike the conventional Hotelling analysis: the cartel tolerates ordinary substitutes to its oil but deters high-potential ones.  Limit-pricing...

The paper proves the existence of equilibrium in nonrenewable resource markets when extraction costs are non-convex and resource storage is possible.  Inventories flatten the consumption path and eliminate price jumps at the end of the extraction period.  Market equilibrium becomes then...

In von Neumann and Morgenstern's sample model of poker, equilibrium has the first player bet with high and low hands, and check with intermediate hands.  The second player then calls if his hand is sufficiently high.  Betting by the low hands is interpreted as bluffing, and is a pure...

Many interactive environments can be represented as games, but they are so large and complex that individual players are in the dark about others' actions and the payoff structure.  This paper analyzes learning behavior in such 'black box' environments, where players' only source of information...

The World's nations have yet to reach a truly effective treaty to control the emission of greenhouse gases.  The importance of compatibility with private incentives of individual countries has been acknowledged (at least by game theorists) in designing climate policies for the post-Kyoto...

Stochastic learning models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level of the learning process is taken to zero.  The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically...

This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privately observedagent types that are persistent over time. For a sufficiently productive relationship,a pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationshipchoose the same action. Necessary and...

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again,...

The diffusion of an innovation can be represented by a process in which agents choose perturbed best responses to what their neighbors are currently doing.  Diffusion is said to be fast if the expected waiting time until the innovation spreads widely is bounded above independently of the size...