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Brain Drain or Brain Gain?Micro Evidence from an African Success Story

Batista, Catia; Vicente, Pedro C. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

Does emigration really drain human capital accumulation in origin countries? This paper explores a unique household survey designed and conducted to answer this specific question for the case of Cape Verde - the sub-Saharan African country with the largest fraction of tertiary-educated...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047844

Why Doesn't Labor Flow from Poor to Rich Countries? Micro Evidence from the European Integration Experience

Batista, Catia - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

Joining the EU is a natural experiment that drastically opens the borders of richer European countries to immigration. However, migration flows from southern Europe responded little to free migration after 1986, despite substantial differentials in real GDP per worker. The simple...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051168

Integration and Search Engine Bias

Cornière, Alexandre de; Taylor, Greg - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

Competition authorities all over the world worry that integration between search engines (mainly Google) and publishers … against publishers that display many ads - even without integration. Although integration may lead to own-content bias, it … can also reduce bias by increasing the value of a marginal consumer to the search engine. Integration also has a positive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004347

Culture and Corruption

Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2006

Working with a sample of individuals from 43 countries, including some of the most and least corrupt in the world, we run an experiment in which: `private citizens` have to decide whether and how much to offer `public servants` in exchange for corrupt services; `public servants` have to decide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010820336

The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004152

Bargaining for bribes under uncertainty

Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

A corrupt transaction is often the result of bargaining between the parties involved. This paper models bribery as a double auction where a private citizen and a public official strategically interact as the potential buyer and the potential seller of a corrupt service. Individuals differ in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004168

Combining Top-down and Bottom-up Accountability: Evidence from a Bribery Experiment

Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

Monitoring corruption typically relies on top-down interventions aimed at increasing the probability of external controls and the severity of punishment. An alternative approach to fighting corruption is to induce bottom-up pressure for reform. Recent studies have shown that both top-down...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004232

Corruption and culture: An Experimental Analysis

Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

Why do some people choose corruption over honesty and others not? Do the social norms and values prevailing in the societies in which they grew up affect their decisions? In 2005, we conducted a bribery experiment and found that, among undergraduates, we could predict who would act corruptly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004448

Externality and framing effects in a bribery experiment

Barr, Abigail; Serra, Danila - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

Using a simple one-shot bribery game, we find evience of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by a third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are increased bribes are less likely to be offered and accepted. And when the game is presented...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004474

Group-based Funeral Insurance in Ethiopia and Tanzania

Dercon, Stefan; Bold, Tessa - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004

A funeral is a costly occasion. This paper studies indigenous insurance institutions developed to cope with the high costs of funerals, based on evidence from rural areas in Tanzania and Ethiopia. These institutions are based on well-defined rules and regulations, often offering premium-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604840