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Information Costs, Networks and Intermediation in International Trade

Petropoulou, Dimitra - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

This paper presents a pairwise matching model with two-sided information asymmetry to analyse the impact of information costs on endogenous network building and matching by information intermedairies. The framework innovates by examining the role of information costs on incentives for trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977860

Competing for Contacts: Network Competition, Trade Intermediation and Fragmented Duopoly

Petropoulou, Dimitra - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

A two-sided, pair-wise matching model is developed to analyse the strategic interaction between two information intermediaries who compete in commission rates and network size, giving rise to a fragmented duopoly market structure. The model suggests that network competition between information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090624

Competition in Posted Prices With Stochastic Discounts

Gill, David; Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

We study price competition between firms over public list or posted prices when a fraction of consumers (termed 'bargainers') can subsequently receive discounts with some probability. Such stochastic discounts are a feature of markets in which some consumers bargain explicitly; of markets in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004203

Competition in Posted Prices With Bargaining

Gill, David; Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

In this paper we study price competition between firms when some consumers attempt tobargain while others buy at the public list or posted prices. Even though bargainers succeed innegotiating discounts off the list prices, their presence dampens competitive pressure in the marketby reducing the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133058

The Optimal Marketing Mix of Posted Prices, Discounts and Bargaining

Thanassoulis, John; Gill, David - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2010

In many markets firms set posted prices which are potentially negotiable. We analyze the optimal marketing mix of pricing and bargaining when price takers buy at posted prices but bargainers attempt to negotiate discounts. The optimal bargaining strategy involves the firms offering...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008469784

Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2009

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004186

Auctions: Theory and Practice

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2004

picking selectively â€“ an advanced undergraduate or MBA course on auctions and auction design. Part A introduces the basic … superficially unconnected with auctions. Part C discusses practical auction design. Part D describes the one-hundred-billion dollar … 3G mobile-phone license auctions. None of the writing is technical, except in the Appendices. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133069

Toeholds and Takeovers

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 1998

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a toehold bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604835

Why Every Economist Should Learn some Auction Theory

Klemperer, Paul - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

None available

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604844

When are Auctions Best?

Klemperer, Paul; Bulow, Jeremy - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604887

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