Showing 121 - 130 of 137
We consider a principal-agent problem where the principal wishes to be endorsed by a sequence of agents, but cannot truthfully reveal type. In the standard herding model, the agents learn from each other`s decisions, which can lead to cascades on a given decision when later agents` private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051146
Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players.  In particular, it is assumed that they know the entire history of the game to date.  Such models can seldom reproduce the cycling of reputations we observe in the real world.  We build a model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291911
This paper analyses collusion-proof multilateral insurance contracts between a risk neutral insurer and multiple risk averse agents in an environment of asymmetric costly state verification.  Optimal contracts involve the group of agents pooling uncertainty and the insurer acting as reinsurer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009318139
This paper shows how to derive a complete set of optimality conditions characterising the solution to a dynamic optimal income tax problem in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971), under the assumption that a 'first-order' approach to incentive compatibility is valid.  The method relies on constructing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364586
This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts.  It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors.  It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671389
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with a continuum of privately observedagent types that are persistent over time. For a sufficiently productive relationship,a pooling contract exists in which all agent types continuing the relationshipchoose the same action. Necessary and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010701819
It is received financial wisdom that when there is free entry by speculators, it is impossible to generate net profits on publicly available information. In this paper we study a version of the standard Kyle (85) model with endogenous information acquisition and we find that equilibria exist...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661389
This paper explores the welfare implications of a securities transaction tax when informed traders act under short-term objectives. The model presented features speculators who can trade on information of differing time horizons, trade by fully rational uninformed agents, endogenous asset prices...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661402
We study price formation in securities markets, using the sequential trade framework of Glosten and Milgrom [7]. This paper makes one basic methodological advance over previous research on sequential securities trading: we allow traders to choose from n trade sizes in a multi-period market,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661423
This paper investigates the incentives of investors to set up an actively managed fund in an emerging market or asset class. The analysis highlights the role of agency problems between fund managers and investors in determining this entry decision. It is shown that investors may wish to set up a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661424