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The formation of community based organizations in sub-Saharan Africa: an analysis of a quasi-experiment

Barr, Abigail; Fafchamps, Marcel - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2010

Previous analyses of the formation and composition of community based organizations (CBOs) have used cross section data. So, causal inference has been compromised. We obviate this problem by using data from a quasi-experiment in which villages were formed by government officials selecting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004231

Bidding for Network Size: Platform Competition when Quality and Network Size are Complements

Foucart, Renaud; Friedrichsen, Jana - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

We study two platforms competing for members by investing in network quality. Quality is complementary to the network … size: the marginal utility generated by an additional member increases with the network's quality. Platforms are imperfect … substitutes: a share of the potential members are biased toward each of the platforms and some are indifferent ex ante. We assume …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004414

Tunnel-proofing the executive suite: temptation, and the design of executive compensation

Noe, Thomas H. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2008

This paper considers optimal compensation for a CEO who is entrusted with administering corporate assets honestly. Optimal compensation designs maximize integrity at minimum cost. These designs are very 'low powered', i.e., while specifying a lower bound for performance and increasing pay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004162

Gaming and Strategic Ambiguity in Incentive Provision

Meyer, Margaret; Ederer, Florian; Holden, Richard - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2013

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments. Ambiguous incentive schemes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004313

China as a Developmental State

Knight, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2012

The paper examines the notion of a 'developmental state' and shows that China possesses the characteristics of a developmental state. It explains the political economy which generated such a state in China and in some other economies. It analyses the methods and mechanisms that were...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011004485

Option Values, Switches and Wages - An Analysis of the Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

Imai, Katsushi; Scandizzo, Pasquale - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2003

Consistent with the theory of real options, it is argued that the value of the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS) in the Indian state of Maharashtra and its impact on workers` behaviour do not depend so much on its income supplementation as on enlargement of opportunities in an uncertain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047828

Scandal, Protection, and Recovery in Political Cabinets

Myatt, David P.; Dewan, Torun - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2005

Empirical evidence suggests that a Prime Minister can benefit from firing ministers who are involved in political scandals. We explore a model in which a minister`s exposure to scandals is positvely related to his policy activism, so that a Prime Minister may wish to protect him from resignation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047938

Bankers' Pay Structure And Risk

Thanassoulis, John - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

-shifting problem by creating incentives to inflate early earnings: to manage this some bonus pay is optimally deferred. As competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914377

Relational Incentive Contracts

Malcomson, James - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2010

This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts. It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors. It...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671389

Certification Disclosure and Informational Efficiency: A Case for Ordered Ranking of Levels

Guerra, Gerardo A. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2001

This paper shows that a monopolistic certifying party can have incentives to disclose revealing information about the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605292