In many rural settings, informal mutual support networks have evolved into semiformal insurance groups, such as funeral societies.  Using detailed panel data for six villages in Ethiopia, we can distinguish two types of contracts, in terms of whether payments are only made at the time of death...

This paper models the implications of endogenous group formation for efficient risk-sharing contracts in the dynamic limited commitment model.  Endogenising group formation requires that any risk-sharing arrangement is not only stable with respect to individual deviations but also with respect...

Internet commerce has made it easier to compare prices and shop online.  However, it has also exposed consumers to a new kind of crime in the form of the electronic theft of payment details.  However the skills required to successfully intercept payment data differ from the skills required to...

We study in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination in a multiplayer dictator game.  An allocator divides a large sum of money among three groups of 20 recipients each and Self.  Allocations to groups are divided equally among the group members.  The three groups are supporters of the...

History offers many examples of dictators who worsened their behavior significantly over time (like Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe), while there are also cases of dictators who have displayed remarkable improvements (like Jerry Rawlings of Ghana).  We show that such mutations can result from rational...

Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies.  However, these elections are frequently flawed.  We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by...

A new game theoretic analysis of finite horizon, complete information bargaining is advanced. The extensive form reflects an attempt to model unstructured negotiations, in which the negotiants can gain no artificial advantage from the details of the bargaining protocol. Conditions are identified...

We investigate the causes of civil war, using a new data set of wars during 1960-99. We test a greed theory focusing on the ability to finance rebellion, against a grievance theory focusing on ethnic and religious divisions, political repression and inequality. We find that greed considerably...

We model the choice of leaders of groups within society, where leaders influence both the mode of interaction between groups (either peaceful compromise or costly conflict) and the outcome of these interactions. Group members may choose leaders strategically/instrumentally or they may choose...

In an asymmetric war of attrition the players` prize valuations are drawn from different distributions. A stochastic strength ordering, based upon relative hazard rates, is used to rank these distributions. The stochastically stronger player is perceived to be strong ex ante, even though her...