Showing 1 - 10 of 35
This chapter reviews the literature on the theory of relational incentive contracts.  It motivates the discussion by the classic applications of relational contracts to the GM-Fisher Body relationship and the relationships between Japanese automobile manufacturers and their subcontractors.  It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008671389
In human capital intensive industries where it is difficult to contract upon the training effort of skilled agents a socially suboptimal level of training may occur. We show how partnership organisations can overcome this problem by tying human and financial capital. Partnerships are opaque so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661387
Until 1970, the New York Stock Exchange prohibited public incorporation of member firms. After the rules were relaxed to allow joint stock firm membership, investment-banking concerns organized as partnerships or closely-held private corporations went public in waves, with Goldman Sachs (1999)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010661417
This paper presents an industry equilibrium model of vertical integration under contractual imperfections with specific input suppliers and external investors.  I assume that vertical integration economizes on the needs for contracts with specific input suppliers at the cost of higher fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047738
The industrial organization of developing countries is characterized by: (i) pervasive use of subcontracting arrangements among small firms, (ii) "missing middle" in the firm size distribution, and (iii) financially constrained firms.  This paper studies an incomplete contract model in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047877
This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047991
This paper examines the optimal structure of hierarchies when workers differ in the range of tasks they can perform. A hierarchical system may reduce costs by allowing most tasks to be handled by unskilled workers. This may however increase delay for those tasks which must pass through several...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010605244
In many rural settings, informal mutual support networks have evolved into semiformal insurance groups, such as funeral societies.  Using detailed panel data for six villages in Ethiopia, we can distinguish two types of contracts, in terms of whether payments are only made at the time of death...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970298
This paper extends the relational contract model in Levin (2003) with shocks to theagent’s cost of effort (agent’s type) to shocks to the principal’s valuation of the agent’seffort (principal’s type). When optimal effort is fully pooled across agent types...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133036
This paper explores the implications of specific training for relational contracts.  A standard result for sustaining a relational contract is that the parties must jointly receive a surplus over what they can get by separating.  This has been interpreted as employees with relational contracts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071727