We develop a model in which cash-constrained entrepreneurs seek a venture capitalist (VC) to finance a new firm. Costly monitoring is employed by VCs to reduce entrepreneurial moral hazard. When monitoring reveals poor performance, VCs want to punish the entrepreneur with liquidation. However,...

We present a model of cash constrained entrepreneurs who need an investor to finance their project. Investors can either be uninformed, such as individual bondholders, or informed, such as venture capitalists and banks. There is an entrepreneurial moral hazard problem, which can be partially...

Consumer leverage can generate financial crises characterized by increased bankruptcy, tightened credit access and reduced demand for goods.  This paper embeds financial frictions in the mortgage contracts of homeowners within a two-sector economy to show that even at moderate initial levels,...

This paper explores the business cycle implications of financial distress and bankruptcy law. We find that due to the presence of financial imperfections the effect of liquidations on the price of capital goods can generate endogenous fluctuations. We show that a law reform that...

We study how deregulation of corporate law affects the decision of entrepreneurs of where to incorporate.  Recent rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have enabled entrepreneurs to select their country of incorporation independently of their real seat.  We analyze foreign...

We model the interaction between two economies where banks exhibit both adverse selection and moral hazard and bank regulators try to resolve these problems. We find that liberalising bank capital flows between economies reduces total welfare by reducing the average size and efficiency of the...

What is the relationship between entrepreneurial saving practices and reinvestment?  We develop a model of entrepreneurial finance and show that entrepreneurial reinvestment decisions depend on the efficiency of saving practices.  Utilizing a novel micro & small enterprise survey from Tanzania...

This paper studies the contracting problem between banks and their bankers, embedded in a competitive labour market for banker talent.  To motivate effort banks must use some variable remuneration.  Such remuneration introduces a risk-shifting problem by creating incentives to inflate early...

Shipping goods internationally is risky and takes time.  To allocate risk and to finance the time gap between production and sale, a range of payment contracts is utilized.  I study the optimal choice between these payment contracts and their implications for trade.  The equilibrium contract...

This study outlines a new theory linking industrial structure to optimal employment contracts and value reducing risk taking.  Firms hire their executives using optimal contracts derived within a competitive labour market.  To motivate effort firms must use some variable remuneration.  Such...